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PRICE OF ANARCHY IN ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC
DEMANDS AND AFFINE COSTS
ROBERTO COMINETTI‡, MARCO SCARSINI¶, MARC SCHRÖDER∗, AND NICOLÁS STIER-MOSES§
Abstract. We consider atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. The game captures
the fact that players may end up not being able to participate. Participation happens independently
and with exogenous probabilities pi ∈ [0, 1] that are common knowledge. Conversely, exclusion
happens with probability 1−pi , in which case players incur no cost. We prove that this is a potential
game, and that the price of anarchy parameterized by the probabilities is a nondecreasing function
of p = maxi pi . The worst case is attained for players with the same probabilities pi ≡ p. In
the case of ane costs we provide an analytic expression for the parameterized price of anarchy
as a function of p. This function is continuous on (0, 1], it is equal to 4/3 for 0 < p ≤ 1/4, and
increases towards the known atomic bound of 5/2 when p → 1. The result follows using the (λ, µ)-
smoothness framework and optimizing the parameters to get sharp bounds. We show that these
bounds are tight and are attained on routing games with purely linear costs (i.e., without constant
terms). Additionally, we derive tight bounds for the price of stability for all values of p ∈ [0, 1].
1. Introduction
The ineciency induced by selsh behavior in congestion games has been studied extensively
in the past twenty years. Initially, the focus was on the simplest case of complete informa-
tion routing games where either the network was very simple—Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
(1999)—or the demand was perfectly divisible—Roughgarden and Tardos (2002). The impact of
selshness is typically evaluated through worst case bounds for the price of anarchy (PoA) and
the price of stability (PoS), depending on the input parameters. Dierent papers made dierent
calls about what aspect to highlight, hence which parametrization to choose. For nonatomic con-
gestion games with ane costs, Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) proved that the PoA is at most
4/3. Research that followed addressed more nuanced situations including players that control
a positive fraction of the demand, removing the restriction that players choose a single route,
and/or considering other solution concepts such as mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria
and coarse correlated equilibria.
More recently, there has been ample interest in understanding the stochastic aspects of con-
gestion games, both on the supply and demand sides. The interest comes from the need to un-
derstand how the uncertainty of latencies—manifested through bad weather or accidents in road
‡ Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile.
¶ Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Roma, Italy.
∗ RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany.
§ Facebook Core Data Science, Menlo Park, USA
E-mail addresses: roberto.cominetti@uai.cl, marco.scarsini@luiss.it,
marc.schroeder@oms.rwth-aachen.de, nicostier@yahoo.com.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classication. Primary: 91A06, secondary: 91A10, 91A43.
Key words and phrases. price of anarchy, price of stability, incomplete information game, routing game, potential
game, (λ, µ)-smoothness.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
03
30
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
 A
ug
 20
19
trac applications, or jitter and failures in telecommunication applications—and the uncertainty
of trac patterns—what origins, destinations and amount of demand materialize in practice—
aect the strategies and behavior of agents playing the game. In this work, we go back to the
selsh congestion model with atomic players put forward by Rosenthal (1973), and we study
atomic congestion games with uncertainty in demand. As a motivation, suppose one is planning
a trip from home to work for the tomorrow morning commute. From routinely making that trip,
one probably knows the possible routes and one might also have an idea of the potential number
of drivers that may be on the road during an average morning. However, how many actual dri-
vers will be there? It is likely that there will be some deviation from the expected number. Such
variability may imply that it is best for one to anticipate and plan the best route accordingly. As
it is common in the literature, we assume that route planning happens before getting any signal
of the realized congestion. This situation can be modeled as a game of incomplete information.
The key assumption of our work is that each player i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} participates in the game with
a certain probability pi , independently of the other players, and otherwise stays out of the game.
The probabilities may dier across players. The number of players and their pi ’s are common
knowledge, but the actual realization of the uncertainty is unknown to the players. When all the
players have the same probabilities pi ≡ p, the eective number of active players is a binomial
random variable with parameters n and p.
This can be modeled with an atomic congestion game in which there is uncertainty about
the number and identities of the players involved. The question we pose is how players should
strategize in this setting. In answering this question, we explore the impact caused by both the
individual optimization of routes and the uncertainty in who shows up. Even though the game
we consider is a game of incomplete information, we show how the game can be transformed
into a deterministic one by appropriately adjusting the cost functions. This allows us to analyze
it as a (regular) complete information game. For these transformed cost functions, we derive tight
bounds for the PoA by using the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework rst explored by Christodoulou
and Koutsoupias (2005), Dumrauf and Gairing (2006), and Harks and Végh (2007), and later thor-
oughly studied by Roughgarden (2015a).
Our contribution. There are two key features in which our analysis diers from previous stud-
ies with similar motivations. First, we consider that the social-planner solution—the yardstick
that all the PoA papers have used to evaluate the eciency of equilibria—is exposed to the same
uncertainty. The strategies are assigned to players before knowing whether they will be active
or not. For the players who show up, the corresponding strategies are used; for the others, the
strategies are discarded. This sets the bar for a fairer comparison since in both situations we have
similar uncertainty. Second, Roughgarden (2015b) showed that PoA bounds for smooth games
also apply to Bayesian extensions of the game as long as types are drawn independently. His
goal was to nd bounds that are independent of the distribution over types, which means that
taking a worst case approach reduces to the case of pi ≡ 1 for all players, and does not provide
specic information for the case of stochastic players. Instead, we consider a weaker denition
of smoothness and we parameterize our bounds explicitly with respect to p = maxi pi . When all
pi are close to zero, one might expect the PoA to be close to one since there is little congestion in
the game (formally, this is not obvious because both the costs of equilibria and social optima tend
to zero as the instance becomes less congested). On the other extreme, if all the pi ’s are close to
one one would expect the game to reduce to the deterministic case. For example, for ane costs,
the PoA should be close to the known bound of 5/2. Through our model, we analyze how the
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actual curve behaves between those extremes and show that the intuition for high values of p is
correct, but the one for small values of p is only partially correct.
We begin by studying the general framework of congestion games with stochastic demands,
proving that these are potential games. We then show that the PoA, dened as the worst case
across instances with bounded probabilities, is a nondecreasing function of p = maxi pi , and that
the worst case scenario arises when all the pi ’s are equal. We prove that in the limit when p → 0,
the PoA converges to 1 if we keep the number of players bounded. When the number of players
may depend on the probability and is allowed to grow, that limit does not hold.
Next, we focus on the case of nondecreasing and nonnegative ane costs. First, observe that
if p = 0, the PoA and PoS are equal to 1. In Theorem 4.1 we establish tight upper bounds for
the PoA as a function of p for p ∈ (0, 1]. This function is continuous and nondecreasing, and, as
shown in Fig. 1, exhibits three distinct regions with kinks at p¯0 = 1/4 and p¯1 ∼ 0.3774 the real
root of 8p3+4p2 = 1. In the lower region 0 < p ≤ p¯0, the PoA is at most 4/3, which coincides with
the PoA for nonatomic congestion games with ane costs. In the middle region p¯0 ≤ p ≤ p¯1, the
PoA is at most
1 + p +
√
p(2 + p)
1 − p + √p(2 + p) ,
while in the upper region p ≥ p¯1, the PoA is at most
1 + p + p
2
1 + p .
For p = 1, we recover the 5/2 bound known for deterministic atomic congestion games with
ane costs, whereas for all p < 1 we get a smaller bound. Note the (perhaps unexpected) fact
that for p ≤ 1/4 we have a signicantly smaller and constant bound of 4/3, and that this holds
independently of the structure of the congestion game and for any number of players. For low
values of p, compared to the case of a bounded number of players, where we noted above that the
PoA is close to 1, its behavior is similar to the one in nonatomic congestion games, if one allows
an arbitrarily large number of players.
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Figure 1. Tight bounds for the PoA (red) and the PoS (blue).
Moreover, using recent results by Kleer and Schäfer (2019), we obtain tight bounds for the PoS
as a function of p. As illustrated in Fig. 1, in this case the function is increasing and smooth,
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except for one kink at p = 1/4. In fact, for 0 < p ≤ 1/4 we have PoS(p) = PoA(p) ≡ 4/3, whereas
for p ≥ 1/4
PoS(p) = 1 +
√
p/(2 + p) .
We show that all the three bounds for PoA mentioned above are tight. In fact, these bounds
are attained in the subclass of routing games (as opposed to general congestion games) and with
purely linear costs (as opposed to ane costs). Example 4.1 shows that the bound is asymptoti-
cally tight for p in the lower region by considering a sequence of bypass networks. Notice that
even though cost functions are linear, due to the randomness in demand, the PoA is not one as
it would be expected in nonatomic congestion games with purely linear costs. In fact, the equiv-
alent deterministic game has adjusted cost functions with a constant term that pushes the PoA
up to 4/3. Tightness in the lower region can also be obtained from a sequence of Pigou networks
with ane costs, see Example 3.1. Example 4.2 shows that the PoA is asymptotically tight for
values of p in the middle region by considering a sequence of roundabout networks. Finally,
Example 4.3 shows that the bound is tight for p in the upper region by considering a variant of
the game dened by Awerbuch et al. (2013). For the upper region, Kleer and Schäfer (2019) give
an alternative sequence of symmetric instances for which the PoA converges to the announced
bound.
2. Related work
The idea of systematically measuring the ineciency of equilibria started with the work of
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou who dened the PoA as the ratio between the social cost of the
worst equilibrium over the minimum social cost (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999, 2009,
Papadimitriou, 2001). The idea has been extensively applied to various classes of games, including
congestion games in general and routing games in particular.
Bounds for the PoA are substantially dierent for atomic and nonatomic congestion games. In
nonatomic games the equilibrium concept is due to Wardrop (1952), and its properties have been
thoroughly studied since Beckmann et al. (1956). Bounds for the PoA in these games were ob-
tained in Roughgarden and Tardos (2002, 2004), Roughgarden (2003, 2005) and Correa et al. (2004,
2008). These papers provide tight bounds for the PoA when the cost functions are restricted to
specic classes—such as polynomials—and show that the bounds depend only on the cost func-
tions but not on the topology of the network. We refer to Roughgarden (2007), Roughgarden
and Tardos (2007), Correa and Stier-Moses (2011) for surveys of these results. On the other hand,
atomic congestion games, and in particular atomic routing games, were introduced by Rosenthal
(1973). The PoA for these games was examined in Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (2005), Suri
et al. (2007), Awerbuch et al. (2013), for weighted and unweighted atomic players. Aland et al.
(2011) provided exact bounds for the PoA when costs are polynomial functions. As an extension
of results by Dumrauf and Gairing (2006) and Harks and Végh (2007), Roughgarden (2015a) in-
troduced the concept of (λ, µ)-smoothness which provides a simple yet powerful tool to bound
the PoA. The bounds obtained by this technique not only hold for pure equilibria, but also for
mixed, correlated, and coarse-correlated equilibria. Our proofs are based on the (λ, µ)-smoothness
framework directly.
Several papers have examined the behavior of the PoA as a function of some relevant parameter
of the model. Correa et al. (2008) provided an expression to compute the PoA as a function of the
maximum congestion level in the network. In the same vein, Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2017, 2019)
studied the asymptotic behavior of the PoA in light and heavy trac regimes, and showed, that
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under mild conditions, eciency is achieved in both limit cases. Similar results for congestion
games in heavy trac were obtained in Wu et al. (2017, 2018, 2019), using a slightly dierent
technique.
Lately, there has been a growing interest in understanding the stochastic aspects of conges-
tion games and studying the consequences of risk aversion (see, e.g., Ordóñez and Stier-Moses,
2010, Nikolova and Stier-Moses, 2014, Lianeas et al., 2019). Piliouras et al. (2016) considered an
atomic congestion model where players using a given resource are randomly ordered, and their
costs depend on their position in this order. By considering dierent risk attitudes of the players,
the authors combine tools from decision theory with the classical PoA analysis of equilibrium
eciency. Closer to our study, Angelidakis et al. (2013) studied a game with risk averse play-
ers, while Penn et al. (2011) and Bilò et al. (2018) dealt with congestion games with failures. In
particular, starting from a dierent framework of interdiction games in which players select ro-
bust strategies that comprise a xed number ρ of edge-disjoint routes, Bilò et al. (2018) achieved
bounds that coincide with ours for values of p = 1/ρ for integer ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Their proofs
do not explicitly use the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework, but exploit a dual-based method to get a
similar inequality that yields bounds for the PoA.
While most previous results concern the PoA and its bounds for games with complete informa-
tion, attention has recently turned to incomplete information games. Gairing et al. (2008) studied
the PoA for congestion games on a network with capacitated parallel edges, where players are
of dierent types—the type of each agent being the trac that she moves—and types are private
information. Wang et al. (2014) considered nonatomic routing games with random demand and
examined the behavior of the PoA as a function of the demand distribution. Roughgarden (2015b)
showed that, whenever player types are independent, the PoA bounds for complete information
games extend to Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the incomplete information game. In particular, for
congestion games with ane costs, the bound of 5/2 holds also for games of incomplete informa-
tion. The denition of smoothness in that framework is more restrictive than the denition we
use, and has stronger implications since the quality of Bayesian-Nash equilibria is compared to an
adaptive denition of optimum. However, because Roughgarden’s bounds are more robust, they
are not as sharp as ours. Recently, Correa et al. (2019) proved a similar result for smooth games
with stochastic demand and arbitrary correlations in the participation probability, but again their
bounds are not tight for a xed p ∈ (0, 1). Wrede (2019) considers the same model as ours, but
restricts attention to games with a small number of players. She gives a precise characterization
of the price of anarchy for two players.
Our model with homogeneous players and ane costs can be seen as a special case of the
perception-parametrized ane congestion games recently studied by Kleer and Schäfer (2019).
These games feature two parameters ρ and σ which aect respectively the cost perceived by the
players and the cost considered by the central planner. Our model corresponds to the case where
ρ = σ = p. Focusing on the results that apply to this case, we observe that their upper bound
coincides with ours for all p ∈ [12 , 1]. They also showed this bound to be tight by adapting an
example of Correa et al. (2015) that shows that the 5/2 bound for atomic congestion games with
ane costs is sharp even for symmetric games. Our results improve both the upper and lower
bounds for PoA. Indeed, on the one hand we show that their upper bound is valid on the larger
interval p ∈ [p¯1, 1], and on the other hand we also obtain tight bounds outside this interval. Kleer
and Schäfer (2019) also investigated the PoS, showing that PoS(p) ≤ 1+√p/(2 + p) for allp ≥ 1/4.
Naturally, this upper bound on PoS is strictly smaller than our two upper bounds for PoA in the
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corresponding range p ∈ [14 , 1]. On the other hand, for 0 < p ≤ 1/4 our Example 4.1 has a unique
equilibrium and thus gives a larger lower bound of 4/3, which combined with our upper bound
on PoA shows that in fact this is sharp with PoA(p) = PoS(p) = 4/3 in this range. Our result thus
complements theirs and completes the characterizations of the PoA and PoS.
In a dierent direction, Chen et al. (2014) studied the PoA for congestion games where players
can be altruistic. Analogously to what is done in our paper, their analysis is based on a variation of
(λ, µ)-smoothness. Other work that investigates the PoA in stochastic models include an article by
Stidham (2014) that studied the eciency of some classical queueing models on various networks,
and one by Hassin et al. (2018) that examined a queueing model with heterogeneous agents and
studied how the PoA varies with the intensity function.
3. Congestion games with stochastic demand
3.1. Atomic congestion games. Consider a nite set of players N = {1, . . . ,n} and a nite
set of resources E . Each player i ∈ N has a set of feasible strategies Si ⊆ 2E . Given a prole
s ∈ S B ×i∈NSi , the cost for player i is
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
ce(Ne(s)) . (3.1)
Here, Ne(s) is the load of resource e ∈ E , dened as the number of players using the resource,
that is,
Ne(s) =
{j ∈ N |e ∈ sj}, (3.2)
and ce :  → + is the cost of the resource e , with ce(k) being the cost experienced by each
player using that resource when the load is k .
The tuple Γ = (N , E ,S, (ce)e∈E ) denes an atomic congestion game (ACG). Recall that a pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE) is a strategy prole sˆ such that no player i ∈ N can benet by unilaterally
deviating to si ∈ Si , that is, for every player i ∈ N and every si ∈ Si , we have
Ci(sˆ) ≤ Ci(si , sˆ−i), (3.3)
where sˆ−i denotes the strategy prole of all players except i . The set of PNE of this game is
denoted by NE(Γ). Since Γ is a potential game, the set NE(Γ) is nonempty (see Rosenthal, 1973).
We dene the social cost (SC) to be the sum of all players’ costs:
C(s) =
∑
i∈N
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈E
Ne(s) ce(Ne(s)) , (3.4)
and we call a social optimum (SO) any strategy prole s∗ that minimizes this aggregate cost. The
price of anarchy and price of stability are then dened as
PoA(Γ) = max
s∈NE(Γ)
C(s)
C(s∗) and PoS(Γ) = mins∈NE(Γ)
C(s)
C(s∗) , (3.5)
comparing the worst and best equilibria, respectively, to the best that a social planner can achieve.
These concepts quantify the quality of equilibria, when one takes a pessimistic or optimistic
perspective for equilibrium selection, respectively.
A handy tool for bounding the PoA is provided by the concept of smoothness. We recall that
a game Γ is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth with λ ≥ 0 and µ ∈ [0, 1) if∑
i∈N
Ci(s′i , s−i) ≤ λC(s′) + µC(s) ∀s, s′ ∈ S . (3.6)
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Lemma 3.1 (Roughgarden (2015a)). If a game Γ is (λ, µ)-smooth, then PoA(Γ) ≤ λ/(1 − µ).
So far, we considered particular instances Γ. Our main goal is to use the lemma to nd the
quality of equilibria across all possible games belonging to a class. The smallest bound that can
be obtained by minimizing λ/(1 − µ) over all parameters satisfying Eq. (3.6) is known to be tight
for congestion games. More precisely, given a family C of cost functions, we call G(C) the class
of all atomic congestion games Γ with costs ce ∈ C, and we set
PoA(C) B sup
Γ∈G(C)
PoA(Γ). (3.7)
For games in G(C) the smoothness condition (3.6) can be translated in terms of the resource costs
k c(m + 1) ≤ λ k c(k) + µmc(m) ∀k,m ∈ , ∀c ∈ C , (3.8)
and, according to Roughgarden (2015a, Theorem 5.8), we have
PoA(C) = inf
{
λ
1 − µ : λ ≥ 0, µ ∈ [0, 1), subject to (3.8)
}
. (3.9)
Remark 3.1. Since the inequality in Eq. (3.8) holds trivially for k = 0, it suces to consider k ≥ 1.
Also, if c(·) is nondecreasing and c(1) > 0, then taking k = 1 and m = 0 imposes λ ≥ 1 in which
case Eq. (3.8) is automatically satised form < k and it suces to considerm ≥ k ≥ 1.
3.2. Stochastic demand. Given an ACG Γ, we consider situations where each player i ∈ N
participates in the game with probability pi , and otherwise remains inactive. An inactive player
incurs no cost. The random variablesWi ∼ Bernoulli(pi) that indicate whether player i is active
are assumed to be independent across players. As in most prior literature, we assume that players
choose their strategies before observing the actual realization of these random variables, so that
no player knows for sure who will be present in the game.1 Given p = (pi)i∈N , the resulting
atomic congestion game with stochastic demand (ACGSD) is denoted by Γp .
This can be framed as a game with incomplete information, for which the standard solution
concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For a strategy prole s = (si)i∈N , we call 1{e∈si } the indi-
cator of the event e ∈ si , and we dene the random resource loads
Ne(s) =
∑
i∈N
Wi 1{e∈si }, and N
−i
e (s) =
∑
j,i
Wj 1{e∈sj } for all i ∈ N , (3.10)
considering all the players or excluding player i , respectively. The total expected cost for player
i ∈ N is then given by
Ci(s) = E
[
Wi
∑
e∈si
ce(Ne(s))
]
=
∑
e∈si
pi E
[
ce
(
1 + N −ie (s)
) ]
. (3.11)
More explicitly, setting p(I) = ∏j∈I pj ∏j<I(1 − pj) for each I ⊆ N , we have
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
∑
I3i
p(I) ce(|{j ∈ I : e ∈ sj}|). (3.12)
1In the context of routing games, Nguyen and Pallottino (1988), Miller-Hooks (2001), Marcotte et al. (2004) con-
sidered a richer set of strategies called hyperpaths in which players are allowed to update their priors along their
journey and switch to alternative routes.
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Clearly, in the deterministic case with pi = 1 for all i ∈ N , the denition of Ne(s) in Eq. (3.10)
coincides with the one in Eq. (3.2), and the cost in Eq. (3.11) is the same as the one in Eq. (3.1).
The notions of equilibrium, SO, PoA, and PoS are extended as follows.
Denition 3.2. A strategy prole sˆ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for Γp if, for each i ∈ N
and every si ∈ Si , we have Ci(sˆ) ≤ Ci(si , sˆ−i). The set of all such BNE is denoted by NE(Γp). A
social optimum (SO) is any strategy prole s∗ that minimizes the expected social cost (ESC)
C(s) =
∑
i∈N
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈E
E[Ne(s) ce(Ne(s))], (3.13)
while PoA(Γp) and PoS(Γp) are dened as in Eq. (3.5) considering this expected social cost.
Example 3.1. Consider a routing game with an arbitrary number of players n = 2k on the Pigou
network shown in Fig. 2 in which all players share a common originO and destinationD. Assume
that pi ≡ p > 0 for all i ∈ N . The cost function on the top link is linear while the cost function
in the bottom link is constant. Note that the constant depends on the number of players and on
the probability. It is suitably chosen to generate the lower bound on the price of anarchy.
O D
1 + 2kp
x
Figure 2. A Pigou network. The arcs are annotated with their cost functions ce (xe ).
We claim that for each player i = 1, . . . , 2k the upper path is a strictly dominant strategy. Indeed,
in every strategy prole there are at most 2k players on the upper link, and thus its expected
cost is at most 1 + (2k−1)p, given that the player is present. The unconditional expected cost
is the previous quantity multiplied by p. This is strictly less than the constant cost of the lower
link. Hence in the unique Nash equilibrium s¯ all players use the upper path, whereas an optimal
prole s∗ is achieved by sending k players on each path. This implies
PoA(Γp) = PoS(Γp) = C(s¯)
C(s∗) =
2kp · (1 + (2k − 1) · p)
kp · (1 + (k − 1)p) + kp · (1 + 2k · p) =
4kp + 2 − 2p
3kp + 2 − p ,
which increases towards 4/3 as k grows to∞, for any p.
We will prove that the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria is nonempty by showing that every
ACGSD is a potential game. We recall that a cost game Γ is called a potential game if there exists
a potential function Φ : S →  such that, for each strategy prole s and any unilateral deviation
s′ = (s′i , s−i) by a player i , we have
Ci(s′) −Ci(s) = Φ(s′) − Φ(s). (3.14)
As shown by Monderer and Shapley (1996), every nite potential game admits a pure equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Every ACGSD Γp is a potential game. In particular NE(Γp) is nonempty.
Proof. Considering the expected Rosenthal’s potential
Φ(s) B E
[∑
e∈E
∑Ne (s)
k=1 ce(k)
]
(3.15)
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we have
Φ(s) −Ci(s) = E
[∑
e∈E
∑N−ie (s)
k=1 ce(k)
]
. (3.16)
Since the latter does not depend on si , it follows that for each unilateral deviation s′ = (s′i , s−i) by
a player i we have Φ(s) −Ci(s) = Φ(s′) −Ci(s′). 
3.3. Homogeneous probabilities. A specially relevant case is that of homogeneous players
with pi ≡ p for all i ∈ N . In this case, the expected cost cpe :  → + for a player using the
resource e is given by
c
p
e (xe) = p · E[ce(1 + Xe)], (3.17)
where Xe ∼ Binomial(xe − 1,p) and xe = ∑i∈N 1{e∈si } is the number of players—active and
inactive—who choose to use resource e . It follows that an ACG Γp with homogeneous stochastic
demand is equivalent to a standard deterministic ACG in which the costs ce(·) are replaced by cpe (·).
Example 3.2. Consider the game in Example 3.1. If pi ≡ p, for all i ∈ N , then the modied cost of
the upper edge e is
c
p
e (xe) = p · E[ce(1 + Xe)] = p(1 + (xe − 1)p). (3.18)
This is upper bounded by p(1 + 2kp) for every xe ≤ 2k , which shows that, whenever the number
of players is at most 2k , the upper edge is a strictly dominant strategy.
The relevance of the homogeneous case is made clear in our next result. It shows that in order
to obtain tight bounds for the PoA in ACGSDs, it suces to focus on the case of homogeneous
players with p = maxi∈N pi , and to check the (λ, µ)-smoothness condition (3.8) for the costs cpe (·)
in the equivalent deterministic game.
Denition 3.4. Given a class of cost functions C, we call Cp the set of all the corresponding
functions cp(·) dened as in (3.18) for each c ∈ C.
Theorem 3.5. Let Γp be an ACGSD with p = (pi)i∈N and let q ≥ maxi∈N pi . If the resource costs
ce(·) belong to the class C, then PoA(Γp) ≤ PoA(Cq). In particular, this worst case bound is attained
when all the players are homogeneous with pi ≡ q.
Proof. LetWi ∼ Bernoulli(pi) be the indicator of the event that player i is active. Set ri = pi/q ∈
[0, 1] and take independent random variables Yi ∼ Bernoulli(ri) and Zi ∼ Bernoulli(q), so that
ZiYi ∼ Bernoulli(pi). Then, for each strategy prole s = (si)i∈N the expected cost for player i is
Ci(s) = E
[
Wi
∑
e∈si
ce(Ne(s))
]
= pi E
[∑
e∈si
ce
(
1 +
∑
j,i
Wj 1{e∈sj }
)]
= ri q E
[∑
e∈si
ce
(
1 +
∑
j,i
Zj Yj 1{e∈sj }
)]
= ri E
[∑
e∈si
q E
[
ce
(
1 +
∑
j,i
Zj Yj 1{e∈sj }
) ∑
j,i
Yj 1{e∈sj }
] ]
.
(3.19)
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Now, conditionally on the event
∑
j,i Yj 1{e∈sj } = k , we have that∑
j,i
Zj Yj 1{e∈sj } ∼ Binomial(k,q) (3.20)
and then the inner conditional expectation is exactly cqe (1 + k), so that
Ci(s) = ri E
[∑
e∈si
c
q
e
(
1 +
∑
j,i
Yj 1{e∈sj }
)]
= E
Yi
∑
e∈si
c
q
e
©­«
∑
j∈N
Yj 1{e∈sj }
ª®¬
 . (3.21)
This shows that the original game Γp is equivalent to a stochastic congestion game with proba-
bilities (ri)i∈N and costs cqe (·) ∈ Cq . Now, from Correa et al. (2019, Theorem 5.3), it follows that
any (λ, µ)-smoothness bound for the deterministic game with costs cqe (·) remains valid for the
ACGSD with probabilities (ri)i∈N , and therefore also for the original game Γp . The conclusion
then follows from the identity (3.9). 
As a consequence of the previous result we obtain the following monotonicity of the PoA with
respect to p.
Corollary 3.6. For every family of cost functions C, the map p 7→ PoA(Cp) is nondecreasing.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ 1. As noted before, every deterministic ACG Γ ∈ G(Cp) is equivalent to
an atomic congestion game with stochastic demand Γp and homogeneous probabilities pi ≡ p, so
that the previous result yields PoA(Γ) = PoA(Γp) ≤ PoA(Cq). The conclusion follows by taking
the supremum over Γ ∈ G(Cp). 
A further consequence of Theorem 3.5 is that for a xed number of players n and under a mild
growth condition on the family of costs C, the price of anarchy converges to 1 as the probabilities
pi tend to 0. In the next section we will see that this is no longer the case if the number of players
is not xed.
Proposition 3.7. Let PoA(C,n,q) denote the supremum of PoA(Γp) over all ACGSDs Γp with costs
in C, a xed number of players n, and pi ≤ q, for i = 1, . . . ,n. Suppose that there exists a constant
σ such that
c(k) ≤ σ c(1) ∀k = 1, . . . ,n, ∀c ∈ C. (3.22)
Then PoA(C,n,q) → 1 as q → 0.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.5, it suces to show that (λ, µ)-smoothness holds with µ = 0 and
some λ = λ(q) such that λ(q) → 1 when q → 0, namely, we require
k cq(m + 1) ≤ λ k cq(k) ∀k ≥ 1,m ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ C.
Clearly, this inequality is equivalent to cq(m + 1) ≤ λ cq(k). On the other hand, since the number
of players n is xed, in any strategy prole the load of any given resource is at most n. Therefore
it suces to have this inequality for k andm + 1 smaller than n. Now, taking X ∼ Binomial(m,q)
we have
cq(m + 1) = q E[c(1 + X )]
= q P(X = 0) c(1) + q P(X > 0) E[c(1 + X ) | X > 0]
≤ q P(X = 0) c(1) + q P(X > 0)σ c(1)
≤ q c(1) + q(1 − (1 − q)n)σ c(1)
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where the last inequality follows from P(X = 0) ≤ 1 and P(X > 0) = 1 − (1 − q)m ≤ 1 − (1 − q)n.
Similarly, since the costs c(·) are non-negative, taking X ∼ Binomial(k − 1,q) we get
cq(k) = q P(X = 0) c(1) + q P(X > 0) E[c(1 + X ) | X > 0]
≥ q P(X = 0) c(1)
= q (1 − q)k−1 c(1)
≥ q (1 − q)n c(1).
The latter yields q c(1) ≤ (1−q)−n cq(k), which, combined with the previous inequality for cq(m+
1), yields the desired conclusion with λ(q) = (1 − q)−n[1 + σ (1 − (1 − q)n)]. 
The condition in Eq. (3.22) holds trivially when the family C is nite. This is the case when we
consider a xed graph G with given costs ce(·) and a xed number of players, and we study the
behavior of the PoA when maxi∈N pi → 0. Another interesting case is when C is the class of all
polynomials with nonnegative coecients and maximum degree d . Indeed, if c(k) = ∑di=0 ai ki
with ai ≥ 0, then for k = 1, . . . ,n we have ki ≤ nd . Therefore
c(k) ≤ nd
d∑
i=0
ai = n
dc(1),
so that Eq. (3.22) holds with σ = nd .
4. atomic congestion games with stochastic demands and affine costs
For the rest of this paper we focus on atomic ACGSDs with nondecreasing and nonnegative
ane costs, that is, we restrict the attention to the class C0 of costs of the form c(x) = a x +b with
a,b ≥ 0. For simplicity, for each p ∈ [0, 1] we dene Gp = G(Cp0 ) and PoA(p) = PoA(Cp0 ).
As a direct consequence of Theorem 3.5, for every atomic congestion game Γp with costs in
C0 and stochastic demands with pi ≤ q, we have the bound PoA(Γp) ≤ PoA(q). The worst case
occurs when all the players are homogeneous with pi ≡ q.
4.1. Tight upper bounds for PoA. The following is the main result of our work. It exploits
(λ, µ)-smoothness to obtain an explicit formula for the map p 7→ PoA(p) shown in Fig. 3.
Theorem 4.1. Let p¯0 = 1/4 and let p¯1 ∼ 0.3774 be the real root of 8p3 + 4p2 = 1. Then
PoA(p) =

4/3 if 0 < p ≤ p¯0,
1 + p +
√
p(2 + p)
1 − p + √p(2 + p) if p¯0 ≤ p ≤ p¯1,
1 + p + p
2
1 + p if p¯1 ≤ p ≤ 1,
(4.1)
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with corresponding optimal (λ, µ)-smoothness parameters given by
(λ, µ) =

(
1, 14
)
if 0 < p ≤ p¯0,(
1 + p +
√
p(2 + p)
2 ,
1 + p − √p(2 + p)
2
)
if p¯0 ≤ p ≤ p¯1,(
1 + 2p + 2p2
1 + 2p ,
p
1 + 2p
)
if p¯1 ≤ p ≤ 1.
(4.2)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
p
PoA(p)
p0
p1
Figure 3. The three curves correspond to the dierent bounds for PoA in the three re-
gions. The upper envelope gives the global upper bound as a function of p.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is rather involved, so we split it into three technical lemmas and
three propositions, each one dealing with one of the three subregions of [0, 1] determined by p¯0
and p¯1. We briey sketch the main steps in the proof.
First we observe that, for each xed p, all games Γ ∈ Gp are (λ, µ)-smooth, so we proceed to
optimize (3.9) over the parameters λ and µ to get the best possible bounds for the class of all
congestion games in Gp . In fact, later in Section 4.2 we will show that these bounds are tight,
even when restricted to the subclass of routing games with purely linear costs.
We next show that the optimization over (λ, µ) can be reduced to the minimization of a one
dimensional convex functionψp(y) over the regiony ≥ 0. This auxiliary functionψp(·) is an upper
envelope of a countable family of ane functions, and for eachp it has a minimizeryp , which takes
dierent values, depending on where p is located with respect to p¯0 and p¯1. This optimal solution
yields the three alternative expressions for PoA(p), with the corresponding optimal smoothness
parameters (λ, µ).
Our starting point is the following simple observation.
Lemma 4.2. A pair (λ, µ) with λ ≥ 0 and µ ∈ [0, 1) satises Eq. (3.8) for the class C = Cp0 i
k(1 +mp) ≤ λ k(1 − p + pk) + µm(1 − p + pm) ∀k,m ∈ . (4.3)
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Proof. For an ane function c(x) = a x + b, we have cp(x) = p[a (1 − p + p x) + b]. It follows that
Eq. (4.3) is just the special case of Eq. (3.8) with a = 1 and b = 0. Conversely, if we start from
Eq. (4.3), multiplying by a ≥ 0 and adding b ≥ 0 on both sides we readily get Eq. (3.8) for cp(·). 
We next show that the minimization in (3.9) can be reduced to a one-dimensional problem.
As already noted, the inequality in Eq. (3.8), or its equivalent Eq. (4.3), is trivially satised for
k = 0 so hereafter we consider the set P of all pairs (k,m) ∈ 2 with k ≥ 1. Then, for any given
µ ∈ [0, 1), the smallest possible value of λ compatible with Eq. (4.3) is
λ = sup
(k,m)∈P
k(1 + pm) − µm(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
= sup
(k,m)∈P
µ
[
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+ (1 − µ) 1 + pm1 − p + pk ,
from which it follows that
PoA(p) = inf
λ,µ
λ
1 − µ = infµ∈[0,1) sup(k,m)∈P
µ
1 − µ
[
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+
1 + pm
1 − p + pk .
Dening
y B
µ
1 − µ ∈ [0,∞) (4.4)
and introducing the functions
ψk,mp (y) = y
[
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+
1 + pm
1 − p + pk , (4.5)
ψp(y) = sup
(k,m)∈P
ψk,mp (y), (4.6)
we obtain the following equivalent expression for the optimal bound in Eq. (3.9):
PoA(p) = inf
y≥0ψp(y). (4.7)
If this inmum is attained at a certain yp , then we get PoA(p) = ψp(yp) together with the corre-
sponding optimal parameters
µ =
yp
1 + yp
and λ = (1 − µ) PoA(p) = ψp(yp)1 + yp .
To proceed, we need the auxiliary functionψ∞(y) dened in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For all p > 0 and y > 0 the following limit is well dened and does not depend on p
ψ∞(y) = lim
k→∞
sup
m≥0
ψk,mp (y) =
(y + 1)2
4y . (4.8)
This function is strictly decreasing for y ∈ (0, 1) and strictly increasing for y ∈ (1,∞).
Proof. Fix y > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1]. The maximum of ψk,mp (y) for m ∈  is attained at the integer m
that is closest to the unconstrained (real) maximizer
m̂ =
(y + 1)pk − y(1 − p)
2yp . (4.9)
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For a large k , we have m̂ ≥ 0 and we may nd f ∈ (−12 , 12 ] such that m̂ =m + f . Then,
sup
m∈
((y + 1)pk − y(1 − p))m − ypm2 = yp(2m̂ −m)m
= yp(m̂ + f )(m̂ − f )
= yp(m̂2 − f 2)
=
((y + 1)pk − y(1 − p))2
4yp − yp f
2,
from which it follows that
ψ∞(y) = lim
k→∞
(y + 1)k + 14yp ((y + 1)pk − y(1 − p))
2 − yp f 2
k(1 − p + pk) =
(y + 1)2
4y .
The monotonicity claims follow at once by computing the derivativeψ ′∞(y) = (y2 − 1)/(4y2). 
The following lemma gathers some basic facts about the function ψp : [0,∞) →  and shows
in particular that its inmum is attained.
Lemma 4.4. For each p > 0 the function ψp(·) is convex and nite over (0,∞), with ψp(y) → ∞
both when y → 0 and y →∞. In particular, the minimum ofψp(·) is attained at a point yp > 0.
Proof. Convexity is obvious since ψp(·) is a supremum of ane functions. The innite limits at
0 and ∞ follow by noting that ψp(y) ≥ ψ∞(y) for y > 0, together with the fact that ψp(0) = ∞
which results from lettingm →∞ in the inequalityψp(0) ≥ ψ 1,mp (0) = 1 + pm →∞.
To show thatψp(y) < ∞ for y ∈ (0,∞), we rewrite the expression ofψp(y) as
ψp(y) = sup
k≥1
1
k(1 − p + pk)
[
(y + 1)k + sup
m≥0
((y + 1)pk − y(1 − p))m − ypm2
]
. (4.10)
Relaxing the inner supremum and considering the maximum withm ∈ we get
ψp(y) ≤ sup
k≥1
1
k(1 − p + pk)
[
(y + 1)k + ((y + 1)pk − y(1 − p))
2
4yp
]
.
The latter is a quotient of two quadratics in k so it remains bounded and the supremum is nite.
Sinceψp(·) is convex and nite on (0,∞), it is continuous. Moreover, since it goes to∞ at 0 and
∞, it is inf-compact and therefore its minimum is attained. 
Our next step is to nd the exact expression for the optimal solution yp for all p ∈ [0, 1]. We
will show that, for p large, the minimum ofψp(·) is attained at a pointyp for which the supremum
in Eq. (4.6) is reached with k = 1 and simultaneously form = 1 andm = 2, that is,
ψp(yp) = ψ 1,1p (yp) = ψ 1,2p (yp).
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For smaller values of p the supremum is still reached at k = 1 with either m = 1 or m = 0, but
also for k andm tending to∞. This suggests to consider the solutions of the equations
ψ∞(y) = ψ 1,0p (y) ⇐⇒ y = y0,p B 1/3 (4.11)
ψ∞(y) = ψ 1,1p (y) ⇐⇒ y = y1,p B
1
1 + 2p + 2
√
p(2 + p)
(4.12)
ψ 1,1p (y) = ψ 1,2p (y) ⇐⇒ y = y2,p B
p
1 + p . (4.13)
Note that these three solutions belong to (0, 1). Let also p¯0 = 1/4 be the point at which y0,p = y1,p ,
and p¯1 ∼ 0.3774 the point where y1,p = y2,p which is the unique real root of 8p3 + 4p2 = 1.
Proposition 4.5. The minimum ofψp(·) is attained at y0,p if and only if p ∈ (0, p¯0].
Proof. We will prove that
ψp(y0,p) = ψ∞(y0,p) = ψ 1,0p (y0,p) i p ≤ p¯0. (4.14)
Assuming this, since bothψ 1,0p (·) andψ∞(·) are minorants ofψp(·), their slopes (ψ 1,0p )′(y0,p) = 1 and
ψ ′∞(y0,p) = −2 are subgradients of ψp(·) at y0,p . Hence 0 ∈ [−2, 1] ⊆ ∂ψp(y0,p) and y0,p is indeed a
minimizer, as claimed.
To prove Eq. (4.14), we observe that the second part of this equality stems from the denition
ofy0,p in Eq. (4.11). To establish the rst equality, we note thatψ∞(·) ≤ ψp(·), so it suces to show
thatψp(y0,p) ≤ ψ∞(y0,p), which is equivalent to
y0,p
[
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+
1 + pm
1 − p + pk ≤
(1 + y0,p)2
4y0,p
∀(k,m) ∈ P i p ≤ p¯0. (4.15)
Substituting y0,p = 1/3, this can be written equivalently as
0 ≤ p(2k −m − 1)2 +m(1 − 3p) − p ∀(k,m) ∈ P .
This holds trivially for m = 0 so we just consider m ≥ 1. Now, for k = m = 1 this requires
p ≤ 1/4. Conversely, if p ≤ 1/4 we have 1 − 3p > 0 and therefore m(1 − 3p) increases with m so
that
p(2k −m − 1)2 +m(1 − 3p) − p ≥ m(1 − 3p) − p ≥ 1 − 4p ≥ 0. 
Proposition 4.6. The minimum ofψp(·) is attained at y1,p if and only if p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1].
Proof. We will prove that
ψp(y1,p) = ψ∞(y1,p) = ψ 1,1p (y1,p) i p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1]. (4.16)
Assuming this, it follows that
(ψ 1,1p )′(y1,p) = p and α B ψ ′∞(y1,p) (4.17)
are subgradients of ψp(·) at y1,p . Now, since y1,p < 1, by Lemma 4.3, we have α < 0 so that
0 ∈ [α ,p] ⊆ ∂ψp(y1,p) and therefore y1,p is a minimizer.
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To prove Eq. (4.17), we observe that the second part of equality stems from the denition of
y1,p in Eq. (4.12). To establish the rst equality, we note that ψ∞(·) ≤ ψp(·), so it suces to show
thatψp(y1,p) ≤ ψ∞(y1,p), which is equivalent to
y1,p
[
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+
1 + pm
1 − p + pk ≤
(1 + y1,p)2
4y1,p
∀(k,m) ∈ P, i p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1].
(4.18)
Dividing by y1,p and letting
z =
1 + y1,p
2y1,p
= 1 + p +
√
p(2 + p), (4.19)
this becomes [
k(1 + pm) −m(1 − p + pm)
k(1 − p + pk)
]
+
1 + pm
1 − p + pk (2z − 1) ≤ z
2.
Multiplying by k(1 − p + pk) and factorizing, this can be rewritten as
Qp(k,m) B p
(
zk −m + (1 − p)z − 22p
)2
+ ((1 − p)z − 1 − p)m − ((1 − p)z − 2)
2
4p ≥ 0, (4.20)
so that, Eq. (4.18) is equivalent to Qp(k,m) ≥ 0 for all (k,m) ∈ P . We observe that
Qp(1, 0) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z ≥ 2 ⇐⇒ p ≥ p¯0 (4.21)
Qp(1, 2) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ 8p3 + 4p2 − 1 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ p ≤ p¯1 (4.22)
so that p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1] is a necessary condition for Eq. (4.18). We now show that it is also sucient.
Case 1. m = 0: The inequality Qp(k, 0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to z(1 − p + pk) ≥ 2 so that the most
stringent condition is for k = 1, which holds for all p ≥ p¯0, as already noted in Eq. (4.21).
Case 2. m = 1: From the very denition of y1,p we have that Eq. (4.18) holds with equality for
(k,m) = (1, 1), so that Qp(1, 1) = 0. Since Qp(k, 1) is quadratic in k , in order to have Qp(k, 1) ≥ 0
for all k ≥ 1, it suces to check that Qp(2, 1) ≥ 0. The latter can be factorized as
Qp(2, 1) = 2(1 + p)z(z − 2) + 1,
so that, substituting z and simplifying, the resulting inequality becomes
4p(1 + p)
√
p(2 + p) + 4p3 + 8p2 + 2p − 1 ≥ 0.
The conclusion follows since this expression increases withp and the inequality holds forp = 1/4.
Case 3. m = 2: As noted in Eq. (4.21) we haveQp(1, 2) ≥ 0 for all p ≤ p¯1. On the other hand, since
z > 1 we have that Qp(k, 2) increases for k ≥ 2, so that it suces to show that Qp(2, 2) ≥ 0. Now,
Qp(2, 2) can be factorized as
Qp(2, 2) = 2(1 + p)(z − 1)2 − 4pz
and substituting z we get
Qp(2, 2) = 4p2(1 + p +
√
p(2 + p)) ≥ 0.
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Case 4. m ≥ 3: Let α = (1−p)z − 1−p be the slope of the linear term in Qp(k,m). Neglecting the
quadratic part we have
Qp(k,m) ≥ αm − ((1 − p)z − 2)
2
4p (4.23)
and therefore it suces to show that the latter linear expression is nonnegative. We claim that
for all p ≤ p¯1 we have α ≥ 0. Indeed, substituting z we get
α = (1 − p)
√
p(2 + p) − p(1 + p),
so that α ≥ 0 if and only if (1 − p)2(2 + p) ≥ p(1 + p)2 which simplies as p2 + 2p ≤ 1 and holds
for p ≤ √2 − 1, and in particular for p ≤ p¯1. Thus, the right hand side in Eq. (4.23) increases with
m, so what remains to be shown is that it is nonnegative form = 3. The latter amounts to
3α ≥ ((1 − p)z − 2)
2
4p ,
which is equivalent to
2(6p + 1 + p2)(1 − p)
√
p(2 + p) ≥ 1 + 2p + 11p2 + 12p3 + 2p4
and can be seen to hold for all p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1]. 
Proposition 4.7. The minimum ofψp(·) is attained at y2,p if and only if p ∈ [p¯1, 1].
Proof. For y = y2,p and k = 1 the unconstrained maximizer in Eq. (4.9) is m̂ = 3/2 so that
supm≥0ψ
1,m
p (y2,p) is attained atm = 1 andm = 2. The slopes of the corresponding terms are
(ψ 1,mp )′(y) =
{
p ifm = 1,
−1 ifm = 2.
If the outer supremum supk≥1 in Eq. (4.10) is attained for k = 1 it follows that 0 ∈ [−1,p] ⊆
∂ψp(y2,p) and, as a consequence, y2,p is a minimizer.
Considering the expression in Eq. (4.10) and substituting the value ofy2,p , it follows that supk≥1
is attained at k = 1 if and only if
(1 + 2p)k + sup
m∈
((1 + 2p)k − (1 − p))pm − p2m2 ≤ [(1 + p)2 + p2]k(1 − p + pk) ∀ k ≥ 2. (4.24)
We claim that this holds if and only if p ∈ [p¯1, 1]. To this end, we note that for all k ≥ 1 the
unconstrained maximum of the quadratic ((1 + 2p)k − (1 − p))pm − p2m2 is attained at
m̂ =
(1 + 2p)k − (1 − p)
2p > 1.
Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 4.3 we may nd an integerm ≥ 1 and f ∈ (−12 , 12 ] such that
m̂ =m + f , hence, the supremum form ∈  is attained atm and
sup
m∈
((1 + 2p)k − (1 − p))pm − p2m2 = p2(m̂2 − f 2) = 14 ((1 + 2p)k − (1 − p))
2 − p2 f 2. (4.25)
Replacing this expression into Eq. (4.24) and after simplication, the condition becomes
0 ≤ [8p3 + 4p2 − 1]k2 + [2 − 2p − 4p2 − 8p3]k + 4p2 f 2 − (1 − p)2 ∀ k ≥ 2. (4.26)
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It follows that a necessary condition is 8p3 + 4p2 − 1 ≥ 0 which amounts to p ≥ p¯1. It remains to
be shown that, once p ≥ p¯1, the inequality Eq. (4.26) holds automatically. Consider rst the case
k ≥ 3. Ignore the nonnegative term 4p2 f 2 and dene
Q(x) = [8p3 + 4p2 − 1]x2 + [2 − 2p − 4p2 − 8p3]x − (1 − p)2. (4.27)
For p ≥ p¯1 this is quadratic and convex in x and we have
Q′(3) = 40p3 + 20p2 − 2p − 4 ≥ 0 ∀p ≥ p¯1.
Hence Q(x) is increasing for x ∈ [3,∞) and then Eq. (4.26) holds for all k ≥ 3 since
Q(k) ≥ Q(3) = 48p3 + 23p2 − 4p − 4 ≥ 0 ∀p ≥ p¯1.
For k = 2 it is not always the case thatQ(2) ≥ 0 so we must consider also the role of the fractional
residual 4p2y2. The inequality to be proved is
2(1 + 2p) + sup
m∈
(1 + 5p)pm − p2m2 ≤ [(1 + p)2 + p2]2(1 + p).
The supremum form ∈  is attained at the integer closest to
m̂ =
1 + 5p
2p = 2 +
1
2 +
1
2p ,
which can be either m = 3 or m = 4 depending on whether p is larger or smaller than 1/2. Now,
for these values ofm, the inequalities to be checked are
2(1 + 2p) + (1 + 5p)3p − 9p2 ≤ [(1 + p)2 + p2]2(1 + p),
2(1 + 2p) + (1 + 5p)4p − 16p2 ≤ [(1 + p)2 + p2]2(1 + p),
which reduce, respectively, to
0 ≤ 4p3 + 2p2 − p,
0 ≤ 4p3 + 4p2 − 2p,
and are easily seen to hold for all p ∈ [p¯1, 1]. 
With all the previous ingredients the proof of our main result is straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Substituting the expressions for the optimal solution yp obtained in Propo-
sitions 4.5–4.7 we get the optimal bound PoA(p) = ψp(yp) which gives Eq. (4.1), as well as the
optimal parameters
µ =
yp
1 + yp
and λ =
ψp(yp)
1 + yp
,
which are shown in Eq. (4.2). 
4.2. Routing gameswith purely linear costs are tight. The following examples show that the
upper bounds in Theorem 4.1 are tight and are in fact attained (at least asymptotically) by network
routing games with purely linear costs (as opposed to ane costs). We proceed in order with three
examples that address the three regimes (0, p¯0], [p¯0, p¯1], [p¯1, 1], for p¯0 = 1/4 and p¯1 ∼ 0.3774.
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Example 4.1. Let k ∈  and consider a routing game with n = 2k players on the bypass network
Bk shown in Fig. 4. Assume that pi ≡ p > 0 for all i ∈ N . Players i = 1, . . . ,k have two strategies,
si and s¯i , to travel from origin Oi to destination Di . Strategy si consists of an exclusive direct link
ei with cost ci(x) = x , while the bypass strategy s¯i uses a faster shared link e¯ with cost
c¯(x) = 11 + 2kp · x
connected to Oi and Di by zero cost links (dashed). The remaining players i = k + 1, . . . , 2k have
a common origin O¯ and destination D¯ with a unique strategy s¯i using the shared link e¯ .
O¯ D¯
e¯
O1 D1e1
O2 D2e2
O3 D3e3
O4 D4e4
O5 D5e5
Figure 4. The bypass network B5. Dashed links have zero cost.
We claim that for each player i = 1, . . . ,k the bypass s¯i is a strictly dominant strategy. Indeed,
in every strategy prole there are at most 2k players on e¯ , and thus, for all s′−i ∈ S−i ,
ci(s¯i , s′−i) ≤ p ·
1
1 + 2kp · (1 + (2k − 1)p) < p = ci(si , s
′
−i). (4.28)
Hence, in the unique Nash equilibrium all players use s¯i , whereas in the optimal prole s∗ players
i = 1, . . . ,k use their exclusive route s∗i = si and players i = k + 1, . . . , 2k use their only available
strategy s∗i = s¯i . This yields the lower bound
PoA(p) ≥ PoS(p) ≥ C(s¯)
C(s∗) =
2kp · 11 + 2kp · (1 + (2k − 1)p)
kp · 11 + 2kp · (1 + (k − 1)p) + kp
=
4kp + 2 − 2p
3kp + 2 − p ,
which increases towards 4/3 as k grows to∞. In particular, it follows that for p ∈ (0, 14 ] we have
in fact PoA(p) = PoS(p) = 4/3.
Example 4.2. Consider a pair of integers m > k ≥ 1 and set n = m + k . We build a graph Gk,m
consisting of a roundabout with n edges of the form (Ai ,Bi), with linear costs hi(x) = γx , where
γ =
p
m(1 − p + pm) − k(1 + pm) , (4.29)
connected by zero-cost links (Bi ,Ai+1) (modulo n). Additionally there are n exit arcs (Bi , Fi) with
costs дi(x) = x . Fig. 5 illustrates the roundabout network G2,4.
Consider players i = 1, . . . ,n with pi ≡ p > 0. Players have origin nodes Oi , each of which has
two outgoing links connecting to the roundabout at the nodes Ai and Ai+k (modulo n). Similarly,
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A1
B1
F1
h1
д1
A2
B2
F2
h2
д2
A3
B3
F3
h3
д3
A4
B4
F4
h4д4
A5
B5
F5
h5
д5
A6
B6
F6
h6
д6
O1
D1
Figure 5. The roundabout network G2,4. For clarity only the origin and destination
for player i = 1 are shown. The corresponding strategies are s∗1 = {h1,h2,д2} and
s1 = {h3,h4,h5,h6,д6}. Dashed links have zero cost.
players have destination nodes Di , each of which can be reached from the exit nodes Fi+k−1 and
Fi+k+m−1 (modulo n). Each player i has two undominated strategies that consist of entering the
roundabout through one of the two available entrances and proceeding clockwise to the closest
exit leading toDi : (1) the short route s∗i = {hi , . . . ,hi+k−1,дi+k−1}, which uses k resources of typehj
and only one дj , and (2) the long route si = {hi+k , . . . ,hi+k+m−1,дi+k+m−1}, which usesm resources
of type hj and only one дj .
If all players choose the long route si , then each hj has a load of m players and each дj a load
of 1, so that every player experiences the same cost
p[mγ (1 − p + pm) + 1].
Shifting individually to the short route s∗i implies the cost
p[kγ (1 + pm) + 1 + p],
so that, by the choice of γ , all players using si constitutes an equilibrium. The social cost of this
equilibrium is
C(s) = np[mγ (1 − p + pm) + 1].
Now, the feasible routing where all players use the short route s∗i gives an upper bound for the
optimal social cost. In this case the loads are k on each hj and again 1 on each дj , so that
C(s∗) ≤ np[kγ (1 − p + pk) + 1],
which yields the following lower bound for the PoA
PoA(p) ≥ (1 + p)m(1 − p + pm) − k(1 + pm)
pk(1 − p + pk) +m(1 − p + pm) − k(1 + pm) . (4.30)
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Take z = 1 + p +
√
p(2 + p) andm = bzkc. Thenm > k for k large enough. In fact,
m
k
=
bzkc
k
→ z, as k →∞.
With this choice ofm both the numerator and denominator in Eq. (4.30) grow quadratically with
k , so that dividing by k2 and letting k →∞ we get the asymptotic lower bound
PoA(p) ≥ (1 + p)z
2 − z
p + z2 − z =
1 + p +
√
p(2 + p)
1 − p + √p(2 + p) . (4.31)
In particular, it follows that for p ∈ [p¯0, p¯1], the previous bound (4.31) for PoA(p) is tight.
Example 4.3. Consider the network congestion game of Fig. 6. The game contains 3 players, 6
costly resources {h1,h2,h3,д1,д2,д3}, and 15 connecting links (the dashed links). Assume that
pi ≡ p > 0 for all i ∈ N . The cost functions are ce(x) = p · x for e ∈ {h1,h2,h3} and ce(x) = x for
e ∈ {д1,д2,д3}, whereas the dashed links have zero cost. Ignoring the dashed links, each player i
has two pure strategies {hi ,дi} and {hi−1,hi+1,дi+1} (all indices are modulo 3).
D1
D2 D3
д1д2
д3
h1h2
h3
O1
O2
O3
Figure 6. The triangle network. The pure strategies {hi ,дi } and {hi−1,hi+1,дi+1} for
player i = 1 are highlighted in red and blue respectively. Dashed links have zero cost.
A strategy prole s is a BNE if si = {hi−1,hi+1,дi+1} for all i ∈ N , since
2p(p + 1) + 1 ≤ p(2p + 1) + (p + 1).
The corresponding expected total costs are
C(s) = 3(p2 · 4p + 2p(1 − p) · p) + 3p.
Second, the strategy prole s∗ in which si = {hi ,дi} yields an expected total cost of
C(s∗) = 3(p2 + p).
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Therefore,
PoA(p) ≥ 3p(1 + 2p + 2p
2)
3p(1 + p) = 1 + p +
p2
1 + p .
In particular, it follows that the previous bound for PoA(p) is tight for p ∈ [p¯1, 1].
We now switch to bounding the price of stability to complement the prior upper and lower
bounds on the PoA, and then conclude by putting these results in perspective in Section 5.
4.3. Price of stability. We conclude by establishing tight bounds for the PoS for games in Gp
in the full range p ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig. 1). This result is a consequence of Kleer and Schäfer (2019,
Theorem 5), except in the range p ≤ 1/4, which follows from our results in the previous sections.
Theorem 4.8. Dene PoS(p) B supΓ∈Gp PoS(Γ). Then
PoS(p) =
{
4/3 if 0 < p ≤ 1/4,
1 +
√
p/(2 + p) if p ≥ 1/4. (4.32)
Proof. Kleer and Schäfer (2019, Theorem 5) already established this tight bound for all p ≥ 1/4.
In the lower range p ≤ 1/4, using Theorem 4.1, we have
PoS(p) ≤ PoA(p) ≤ 4/3, (4.33)
and we conclude by noting that the family of linear cost routing games in Example 4.1 have a
unique equilibrium with PoS arbitrarily close to 4/3. 
5. Conclusions
Roughgarden (2015b) has shown that, when dealing with games of incomplete information,
the bounds for the corresponding games of complete information are still valid. His framework
for incomplete information games is very robust, but requires a smoothness denition that holds
across dierent types (see Roughgarden, 2015b, Denition 3.1 and Remark 3.2). A result in the
same spirit appears in Correa et al. (2019), where it is shown that the bound of 5/2 holds for the
PoA of ACGSDs with ane costs even if the events of players being active are not i.i.d. These
authors consider a class of games and an information structure that makes these objects games
of incomplete information; then they compute bounds for the PoA of games in this class over all
possible probabilities that characterize the incomplete information. They show the remarkable
result that the performance of the PoA does not decay in the presence of incomplete informa-
tion. Our results are in a dierent spirit. We x not only the class of games and the information
structure, but also the probability measure and examine the behavior of the PoA as this proba-
bility varies. In our case, when the probability is characterized by a single parameter p, this is
tantamount as studying the PoA as a univariate function of this parameter. This means that for a
xed value of p, we consider the worst case PoA among all possible instances where participation
probabilities of players are bounded above by p. The main results in this respect are
(1) the monotonicity of the function PoA(p),
(2) the presence of two kinks in this function,
(3) the fact that the minimum of this function is 4/3, which is the bound for the PoA in
nonatomic congestion games with ane costs.
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Several natural questions remain open. First, a precise characterization of the PoA as a function
of p is only available for ane cost functions. What happens for more general cost functions, for
example, polynomials with nonnegative coecients and degree at most d? We know the PoA as
a function of p is nondecreasing, but can we say more?
Second, our upper bound for heterogeneous probabilities depends on the maximum probabil-
ity of each of the players. Are there any other natural parameters that this might depend on?
The following two instances provide evidence that we cannot expect a monotonicity result if we
consider the average number of players in the game as our parameter.
Considering Example 4.3 with p = 1, we compare the situation in which 3 players participate
with probability 1, and 3 players participate with probability 0 to the situation in which all six
player participate with probability 1/2. In expectation, the same number of players participate.
However, in the former case, the PoA is 5/2, whereas in the latter case we know by Theorem 4.1
that the PoA is at most 5/3.
Now, consider a two-link parallel network with ce1(x) = x and ce2(x) = 5/2, and compare
the situation in which 2 players participate with probability 1, and 2 players participate with
probability 0 to the situation in which all four player participate with probability 1/2. In the
former case, for both players it is a dominant strategy to choose e1, yielding a PoA of 8/7, whereas
in the latter case the equilibrium in which all players choose e1 yields a PoA of at least 5/4.
Third, it may be interesting to consider other information regimes for the social optimum. We
assume that the social optimum is the strategy prole that minimizes the social expected costs,
but what if the central planner is able to relocate players after the realization of the random
variables is known? This would imply a stronger version of the social optimum, the prophet
optimum, and bounds against this social optimum would be interesting.
Fourth, an interesting direction would be to further look at convergence results as p → 0 and
see other kinds of limit games that might arise. We have already looked at the cases when the
number of players is bounded or arbitrary.
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